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Africa’s passive revolution: crisis in Malawi
Andrew Brooks and Alex Loftus
Recent protest movements in sub-Saharan Africa have generally failed to effect progressive transformations.
Efforts to achieve social change have been frustrated by governing elites that continue to utilise their vacillating
and unequal relationships with the external environment to sustain power. Although the leading figures may
change, the dominant African class can re-establish leadership through new alliances with domestic and
international networks of capital. To understand such ‘change-without-change’, this paper contributes to the
growing body of literature on Antonio Gramsci’s development of ‘passive revolution’. The comparative character
of Gramscian analysis enables his philosophy of praxis to be translated into very different historical and
geographical settings. With this in mind we draw together recent engagements with passive revolution from
Geography, Politics and African Studies. In particular we develop Jean-Francois Bayart’s notion of extraversion,
while considering it in relation to more recent philological engagements with Gramsci. Our empirical focus is the
politics of transition in Malawi. In his second term in office, the autocratic and unpopular president, Bingu wa
Mutharika, implemented economic policies that ran against neoliberal orthodoxy and suppressed protest during
a period of crisis. Mutharika was replaced, following his death in 2012, by Joyce Banda, a previously
marginalised vice-president, who nurtured a re-engagement with transnational capital. Working through the
state, Banda led a transformation from on high and moved to impose new economically liberal policies,
including a major currency devaluation, which reduced living standards for many. We draw our empirical
material from Chancellor College, a major site of protest against Mutharika in 2011. Evidence from interviews
with staff and students demonstrates how two episodes of revolution/restoration in Malawi, a country distant
from the western historical experience, can be interpreted through Gramsci’s socially differentiated
understanding of politics.
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Introduction
If the uprisings of 2011 briefly kindled a sense of the
possibilities for social change in many parts of the
world, where regimes had previously appeared ossified
or intransigent, they left sub-Saharan Africa devoid of
any such optimism. Whether or not the African
continent is best understood as part of a continuing
tragedy, as Colin Leys (1994) once suggested, few have,
in recent years, detected any real sign of a transforma-
tion of social and political relations from below
(Seddon and Zeilig 2005). Indeed, notwithstanding
the ‘popcorn protests’ across South Africa and else-
where, what seems more important to capture is how
social change is continually frustrated: governing elites
are able to ensure ‘democratisation’, ‘good governance’
or a post-apartheid dispensation without fundamental
political or social change (Mottiar 2013). Few concepts
have the power to capture this ‘change-without-change’
as effectively as Antonio Gramsci’s development of
‘passive revolution’. Although, as Hart (2013, 214)
notes, Gramsci is often wrongly referred to as a
Western Marxist, he was deeply attentive to the
articulation of historically and spatially uneven pro-
cesses of development. This attentiveness to difference
ensures that his work is unusually pertinent in consid-
ering the ‘relations of force’ in a wide range of different
contexts. Indeed, Gramsci’s oeuvre has a profoundly
comparative character that enables the further transla-
tion of concepts such as passive revolution, ensuring
they can do analytical work in very different historical
and geographical settings. Thus, we build on recent
writings on passive revolution (Bayart 1993; Hart 2013;
Morton 2013) in our analysis of processes of revolution/
restoration in Malawi. Two episodes are explored:
Malawi’s state-led partial disengagement from the
external economy in 2009–12, and the subsequent
transition between Presidents Bingu wa Mutharika and
Joyce Banda.
Bingu wa Mutharika governed Malawi between
2004 and 2012. In the latter half of this period, his
leadership was marked by anti-Western rhetoric and an
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increasingly authoritarian form (Cammack 2012). Fol-
lowing re-election in 2009, Mutharika’s economic
policies ran against neoliberal orthodoxy: Malawi did
not follow good governance policy prescriptions, the
national currency was overvalued, foreign businesses
were expelled and subsidies were provided to farmers.
Very rapidly, the disciplining effects of global markets
sparked a period of crisis that coincided with the Arab
Spring and what appeared to be major successes for
popular movements elsewhere in the world. Building
on the window of opportunity that presented itself, a
fledgling opposition briefly emerged among urban-
based human rights NGOs, and staff and students at
Chancellor College in Zomba, the largest college of the
University of Malawi. The opposition was not without
its own internal contradictions and was quelled by
Mutharika. However, to paraphrase William Morris,
change came about in spite of the movement’s
suppression when, on 5 April 2012, the President died
of a heart attack. Joyce Banda, the formerly disenfran-
chised vice-President, assumed power, quickly becom-
ing a ‘darling’ of the global North (Mwale 2014). One
of Banda’s key changes was to implement a currency
devaluation that had been called for by the donor
community (Cammack 2012). This devaluation – cele-
brated by some Malawians and widely praised interna-
tionally as a progressive step for the country – had
devastating consequences for the livelihoods of many.
Small salary increases in no way matched the dramatic
inflation in prices (CfSC 2012) witnessed within the
country. Through a series of interviews with staff and
students at Chancellor College, we chart the changes
that took place within the Malawian state form. Initially
turning to the resurgence of writings on Gramsci’s
philosophy of praxis, we then consider how the concept
of passive revolution has led to new readings of African
political realities. In the latter half of the paper we turn
to the processes through which Mutharika practised
what Bayart (1993) refers to as extraversion, through a
partial disengagement from international capital flows.
Although we have some reservations over the manner
in which Bayart reads the socio-spatial dynamics of
passive revolution, we see great potential in a dialogue
with more recent philological (Thomas 2009a) and
geographical engagements with the concept (Hart
2013). The ambitious sweep of Bayart’s work, although
sometimes conceptually loose, enables an understand-
ing of broader postcolonial transitions developing
across the African continent. As part of a larger project
we intend to expand this dialogue within and beyond
geography in order to read Africa’s contemporary
passive revolutions. We then look at how the transition
from Mutharika to Banda was enacted, drawing exten-
sively from the interviews at Chancellor College before
concluding by reasserting the need to translate passive
revolution to other times and places.
Passive revolution: translating Gramsci
into African realities
Interest in Antonio Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis has
grown exponentially within the Anglophone world over
the last decade (Ekers et al. 2013; Green 2011; Morton
2007; Thomas 2009a) prompting a revitalisation of
Marxism. Shaped in large part by the availability of
Gramsci’s Prison notebooks in full editions – as opposed
to selective thematic editions – in several different
languages, this latest wave of Gramsci scholarship has
been spearheaded by more philological approaches
that pay far closer attention to the development of
concepts within the notebooks, eschewing some earlier
claims about the fragmentary, disjointed or episodic
character of the texts (Thomas 2009a). Easily the most
lauded of these new engagements has been Peter
Thomas’s The Gramscian moment (2009a), which draws
from un-translated Italian and German debates, while
embarking on a painstaking philological reading of
Gramsci’s overall philosophy of praxis.
Such philological approaches have, nevertheless, not
been without their critics. In spite of Thomas’s call to
renew ‘an organic relationship between leftist theory
and forms of organization . . . that today compose . . .
the “subaltern social groups”’ (2009b, 34), his reference
points are almost always historical rather than contem-
porary. Others have therefore sought to do as Thomas
suggests, renewing this ‘organic relationship’ through
meeting Gramsci’s challenge to ‘translate’ the philos-
ophy of praxis within a wide variety of different
contexts. Two of the finest examples of such ‘transla-
tions’ are Adam Morton’s (2011) reading of passive
revolution within the Mexican state form and Gillian
Hart’s (2013) interpretation of passive revolution as a
process of de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation
within South Africa. Indeed, alongside Hart, several
other geographers have developed the philosophy of
praxis in a range of quite different contexts (Gidwani
and Paudel 2013; Nash 2013). One of the challenges for
such scholarship is how to retain the close philological
reading that has transformed Gramscian scholarship in
recent years, while developing an approach that is
equally attentive to emergent processes. Unsurpris-
ingly, new readings of passive revolution, positioned in
relation to Gramsci’s overall philosophy of praxis, have
enabled such an approach to flourish (Morton 2010).
Perhaps there is a certain irony that a concept
initially developed to make sense of the specificities of
the Italian historical experience should be taken to
understand the historical geographies of such a range
of different places. Nevertheless, as the Brazilian
scholar Carlos Nelson Coutinho suggests, the extension
of the concept to a range of different historical and
geographical moments is ‘methodologically authorized
by Gramsci himself, since he was the first to extend the
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notion of passive revolution to whole different histor-
ical periods’ (2012, 101). Indeed, following the devel-
opment of passive revolution as a means through which
he can gain an understanding of the Italian Risorgi-
mento, Gramsci later uses the concept to describe a
more general historical period, before using passive
revolution as part of a comparative method. In what
follows, we will detail these different usages, before
turning to how this interpretative method has been
developed in recent writings focusing on African
contexts, enabling a consideration of how passive
revolution might ‘travel’ to a Malawian context.
Gramsci takes the expression passive revolution from
the historian Vincenzo Cuoco (Gramsci Q19 §24; 1971,
59) who described, in 1799, the failure of the Neapolitan
revolution; nevertheless, Gramsci ‘uses the expression of
Cuoco’s in a slightly different sense from that which
Cuoco intended’ (Q19 §24; 1971, 59) in order to
understand the peculiar process of bourgeois state
formation that Italy experienced throughout the 19th
century. The period known as the Risorgimento saw the
political unification of the fragmented political geogra-
phy of different states of Italy under a single state form.
The peculiarities of the Italian situation for Gramsci
existed in the type of ‘“revolution” without a “revolu-
tion”’ (Q19 §24; 1971, 59). The potential ‘Jacobins’,
those who in the French context hadmade the revolution
so successful, failed in Italy, as the demands of the Partito
d’Azione came to be absorbed and accommodated within
the political programme of the ‘Moderates’. In contrast,
in France the Jacobins represented both the needs and
aspirations of the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary
movements as a whole (Q19 §24; 1971, 78).
With the crucial Jacobin element lacking in the
Italian context, the Risorgimento came to be defined
through the process of transformism: the simultaneous
absorption of the Action Party into the Moderates; and
the ‘decapitation’, as opposed to absorption, of the
masses in relation to the new State (Q19, §26; 1971,
98). The Risorgimento thus became a peculiar combi-
nation of ‘revolution/restoration’ (Gramsci Q15, §11;
1971, 109). As Peter Thomas writes,
It was a transformation of political forms undertaken by elites,
garbed in the rhetoric of previous revolutionary movements,
butwithout the extensive involvement of subaltern classes that
had led to the placing in question of social and economic
relations in earlier transformations. (2006, 72)
Thomas goes on to note how it quickly became clear
to Gramsci that the concept of passive revolution had a
more general applicability in other contexts where
states had made a transition to modernity without
popular participation from below. Indeed, passive
revolution can be understood as the specific route to
modernity taken by a range of European nation states
(2006, 72), Bismarckian Germany being among the
most prominent. Further extending the concept (for
criticism see Callinicos 2010), Gramsci goes on to view
passive revolution as a description of a much more
expansive historical period in Europe.
Coutinho (2012) claims that the key features of
passive revolution are, therefore (a) the strengthening
of the state in relation to civil society and (b) the
process of co-optation of elements from below through
the practice of transformism. Thus, even if leadership is
enacted more through state forms, when understood
through the delicate balance between consent and
coercion, consensual forms of leadership are never
absent within passive revolution. Nor, as the above
makes clear, should the concept of passive revolution
imply a true passivity. Indeed, as Morton writes, ‘the
process is not therefore literally “passive” but refers to
the attempt at “revolution” through state intervention’
(2007, 64). It simultaneously involves ‘the inclusion of
new social groups within the hegemony of a political
order without an expansion of mass-producer control
over politics’ (2007, 64). Thus, the state replaces local
social groups in leading a process of revolution/
restoration. As will be seen, both Mutharika and
Banda developed such transformist strategies in a
variety of different ways from the former’s attempt to
construct shared moral and cultural values to the
latter’s co-optation of some of the forces for change in
the immediate period after her resumption of power.
Having established that Gramsci invites an extension
of the concept of passive revolution through his own
method, Coutinho (2012) goes on to develop a
relational understanding of the state form within
Brazil. Coutinho’s approach here accords with other
efforts to extend passive revolution not through the
amassing of various ‘case studies’ but through a careful
method of relational comparison as in the work of Hart
(2002). Tugal (2009) has therefore developed passive
revolution to understand the absorption of Islam within
the state form of Turkey, enabling related understand-
ings of both Egypt and Iran; Chatterjee has used the
concept, albeit in a slightly confusing fashion, to
capture ‘the nationalist marriage of progress in social
justice’ (1986, 132) within Nehru’s vision for India;
Morton (2007 2011) has developed passive revolution
in a Mexican context; Hesketh and Morton (2014)
have, more recently, analysed emergent class strategies
of passive revolution within a Bolivian context; and in
South Africa, Hart (2013) has extended her method of
relational comparison to analyse the specific form that
passive revolution has taken.
Although the range of analyses of passive revolution
suggest a real fecundity to the concept, Alex Callinicos
notes that passive revolution suffers from ‘a chronic
problem of over-extension’ (2010, 492) within the
notebooks themselves (covering everything from
the Risorgimento to Italian Fascism, Americanism and
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Fordism), and a worsening over-extension in the
proliferation of secondary analyses. While recognising
that the concept can be used to describe a set of ‘socio-
political processes in which revolution inducing strains
are at once displaced and partially fulfilled’ (2010, 492),
Callinicos cautions against the overenthusiastic appli-
cation of a concept in such a variety of different
contexts. Morton (2010) responds with a forceful
defence of recent approaches, emphasising above all
the need to translate passive revolution across a variety
of differing historical and geographical conditions that
are always understood relationally. The emphasis on
‘translation’ emerges in part from an acknowledgement
of the importance of Gramsci’s linguistic training to the
development of his philosophy of praxis (see Ives 2004;
Boothman 2010; Ives and Lacorte 2010) and of
Gramsci’s linguistically inspired response to Lenin’s
comment that the Russian Revolution had not yet been
able to ‘translate’ its language into those of Western
Europe (Gramsci Q11, §46; 1995, 306; Thomas 2009b,
29). This response consisted of a detailed reconnais-
sance of the specific conditions through which a
revolutionary social transformation might be possible
within the ‘West’. Indeed the ‘guiding thread that
organizes all of Gramsci’s carceral research’ (Thomas
2009a, 136) can be understood in terms of this need for
translatability in the context of the specific conditions
generated by passive revolution: it ‘can be succinctly
characterized as the search for an adequate theory of
proletarian hegemony in the epoch of the “organic crisis”
or the “passive revolution” of the bourgeois “integral
State”’ (2009a, 136, emphasis in original; Coutinho
(2012, 50) makes a very similar point). Translation
becomes crucial to this search for an adequate theory.
It requires, as Kipfer and Hart note, both a fidelity to
the key coordinates of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis
as well as ‘moving beyond Gramsci today’, an act that
involves elements of betrayal ‘in the spirit of translation
as Gramsci conceived and practiced it’ (2013, 331).
Against an austere historicism, such an act of transla-
tion requires patient attention to the absolute histori-
cism that was so central to Gramsci’s overall philosophy
of praxis (Morton 2007) and an approach that is rooted
within and also against the Prison Notebooks. Recog-
nising the partiality of the notebooks further reinforces
the need for translation across different registers. In
responding to this need, passive revolution becomes for
Hart (2013) a vital ‘criterion of interpretation’ that can
be extended to other contexts. It is necessary to revisit
passive revolution as ‘a profoundly spatio-historical
concept that calls for relational forms of comparison’
while simultaneously re-emphasising its profoundly
dialectical character, and acknowledging its close
connections with both the philosophy of praxis and
with Fanon’s struggle for a new humanism (Hart 2013,
222). Thus, passive revolution must be
attentive to specificities as well as to interconnections; to the
ongoing reverberations of colonial histories and changing
forms of imperialism; and to the constitutive articulations of
race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with class nationalisms.
(Hart 2013, 224)
We seek to build on the work of Hart (2013),
Morton (2011) and others in our own efforts to
translate Malawi’s passive revolution. In so doing, we
seek to provide further illustration of how passive
revolution has unfolded in an African context. The
Malawian study will therefore become part of a larger
project of translating Africa’s passive revolutions over
the 20th and 21st centuries.
In contextualising more recent efforts to interpret
Africa’s passive revolution, of which we see this paper
as one contribution, it is important to consider the
earlier reading of Jean-Francois Bayart. Writing over
two decades before Hart’s analysis of South Africa’s
ongoing passive revolution, Bayart (1993) applied the
same ‘criterion of interpretation’ to the historical
sociology of the postcolonial African state. For Bayart
(1993), African societies lack three groups that are
traditionally ascribed a leading role in Eurocentric
analyses: landowners are historically absent; the peas-
antry is a fragmented class; and the industrial working
class is very limited in size. Throughout the develop-
ment of capitalism across the continent, political
society and capital have therefore been unable to
intensify the exploitation of their dependents: never-
theless, political and economic elites have proliferated
and flourished (Harrison 2010; Hirschmann 1990).
Writing against what he perceives to be ‘structuralist
weaknesses’ of dependency theory, Bayart therefore
emphasises the manner in which African innovations
have overcome the weak productive forces and bitter-
ness of internal social struggles to enable accumulation
by national ruling classes (Bayart 1993). Central to
Bayart’s translation of passive revolution is the concept
of ‘extraversion’. Extraversion acknowledges the dif-
fering ways in which elites mobilise resources that can
be accrued through unequal relationships with donors,
corporations and multi-lateral agencies. Thus, although
African states’ relationships with external powers are
unequal, they are not static and have long provided
room for manoeuvre for local ruling classes. African
leaders have therefore domesticated colonial institu-
tions and appropriated post-colonial practices, some-
times opposing dependency while at other moments
facilitating external domination. Importantly extraver-
sion can involve neopatrimonialism, and patrons may
use state resources to reinforce social hierarchies in
order to secure the loyalty of their clients, but
extraversion is not restricted to patronage and also
encompasses other political acts that can disrupt
existing social hierarchies. Rulers can manoeuvre to
enhance their position vis-a-vis global capital while
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marginalising local actors. Classifying such leaders as
either nationalists who serve local clients or as
collaborators with international elites thereby fails to
capture the manner in which internal societal forms are
actively shaped through domestic leaders’ relations
with external environments.
The origin and sustained power of the African elite
within the postcolonial state can be explained through
Gramsci’s understanding of politics:
[T]he concept of passive revolution is extremely useful for it
synthesises the ‘educated’ people’s rise to power, their
seizure of State resources, and their refusal to enhance and
radicalise popular movements against colonialism. And even
better, Gramsci’s concept explains the process whereby the
‘educated’ group reached an understanding with those who
held power previously, and how this process was reproduced
on a larger scale. (Bayart 1993, 181)
Crucially, the ‘understanding’ reached with former
colonisers does not mean a straightforward continua-
tion of collaboration in the mode of neo-colonialism, as
might have been argued by dependency theorists.
Dominant groups in Africa are active agents in the
making of their histories, working to extract rent from
their position as intermediaries vis-a-vis the interna-
tional system, gaining revenues from agricultural levies,
natural resource extraction, consumer imports, foreign
investments and development aid – frequently to the
exasperation of external elites (Bond 2006). Colonisa-
tion enabled extraversion by providing opportunities
for accumulation to the direct benefit of some Africans.
During the colonial period, existing African political
formations took advantage of European occupations to
strengthen or protect regional power, as some factions
gained power and wealth at the expenses of others
thanks to foreign support (Davidson 1994). Coopera-
tion was ambivalent and mediated by misunderstand-
ing, as much as the local social context of African
politics is misunderstood today (Biruk 2014). Thus,
Bayart convincingly argues that the narrow neo-
colonial perspective diminishes the role of indigenous
participants, framing them as mere handmaidens to
foreign power:
African governments exploit, occasionally skilfully, the
resources of a dependence which is, it cannot ever be
sufficiently stressed, astutely fabricated as much as prede-
termined. Both on their political stage and within the world
system, they pursue their own objectives, within the margins
of failure and success that the implementation of any
strategy entails. (1993, 26)
Inequality has been sustained and capitalist devel-
opment curtailed because of the strength of the
political settlement in post-colonial states. In the years
following formal decolonisation across Africa, Assimi-
lados in former Portuguese colonies, BEE (Black
Economic Empowerment) elites in South Africa,
Evoules in the Francophone West and foreign-educated
upper classes everywhere gladly engaged in accumula-
tive power (Bayart 1993; Hart 2013). Revolutionaries
and young ideologues become reactionaries, happily
participating as privileged members of a small class that
has further gained from the ‘neoliberalisation’ of Africa
(Harrison 2010). In a process of ‘transformism’,
Western-educated African state bureaucrats work with
policy advisors and economic managers from the
international financial institutions and donor commu-
nity to ‘fix’ problems such as inflation, unemployment
and demand (Sylvester 1990, 458). However unlikely it
is that such ‘fixes’ will correct social problems, intel-
lectuals, as in the Risorgimento, are absorbed into
governing elites and potential opposition is diminished.
Thus, today, the most influential elites are defined by
their relationships to the IMF, World Bank and the
former metropoles, even as these developmental actors
are themselves being challenged through the sourcing
of investment from China and other emergent powers.
Such a pattern of passive revolution can be seen
during times of organic crisis when the national
bourgeoisie is too weak to establish hegemony in the
sense of an ideological bond between itself and other
social groups that would enable a consolidation of
power. An organic crisis is ‘the moment when the
bourgeoisie’s claims to universality, to advance the
common good, were revealed to be in the service of
particularist [sic] interests, namely, the accumulation of
capital in the hands of the ruling class’ (Thomas 2009a,
145), and it provides a window of opportunity for
subordinate groups to build a movement capable of
challenging the existing order. However, if this oppor-
tunity is not taken, the balance of power will shift back
to the dominant class, which can survive and
re-establish its leadership through new alliances, often
co-opting former members of the opposition and
projecting a new or altered capitalist trajectory
(Sylvester 1990). Individuals claiming to speak for
subordinate classes are thereby incorporated into elite
networks (Hart 2013). In such moments, passive
revolution enables us to understand ‘how one part of
the bourgeoisie gathers the rest of the class around
itself’ (Bayart 1993, 182) without achieving the Jacobin
moment referred to earlier. The vulnerability of the
livelihoods of the majority and a lack of class consol-
idation are barriers to popular engagement with radical
politics, but, just as importantly, ‘the subaltern classes
are held in a passive position because their potential
leadership is co-opted’ (Adamson 1980, 175).
Gramscian scholarship has not previously interro-
gated the political history of Malawi, but empirical
studies of neighbouring Zimbabwe illustrate how pas-
sive revolution might elucidate political shifts. Sylvester
(1990) identifies two episodes of passive revolution in
Zimbabwe and more recently Raftopoulous (2010) has
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identified a third moment. The first was led by the
White ruling classes, who consolidated power between
the end of the Second World War and Zimbabwean
independence in 1979. The second episode erupted
within the nationalist movement. Zimbabwean parties
inadvertently mirrored the Rhodesian state they had
sought to defeat. Through the accumulation and
consolidation of power by Robert Mugabe, opposition
was co-opted into government and discontent smashed.
First in 1980 Mugabe’s ZANU party merged with the
opposition Patriotic Front, forming ZANU-PF, then in
1987 the opposition ZAPU was absorbed into ZANU-
PF. Following this success, Mugabe established a fragile
hegemony while simultaneously isolating Zimbabwe
from the global economy through the late 1990s. With
the ensuing crisis in the 2000s, Mugabe’s authority
appeared to wane: nevertheless, in one of the most
remarkable turnarounds, Mugabe further consolidated
his rule through drawing the MDC into a power-
sharing agreement in 2008. Raftopoulous (2010) unsur-
prisingly cites this neutralisation of the MDC as yet
another episode of passive revolution.
Some similar processes can be witnessed in the
Malawian case, although there are also profound
differences. Thus, in seeking to better understand the
process of transformism through which passive revolu-
tion has been enacted in Malawi, we focused our
fieldwork on the local intellectual class that operated
outside of the ruling elite and without direct association
with Malawian civil society organisations. Empirical
material comes from 26 in-depth interviews carried out
in January–February 2013 with staff and students at
Chancellor College, Zomba, a key site of struggle
during the developing organic crisis (Cammack 2012).
University staff and students constitute part of the
terrain of civil society that in a Gramscian sense is part
of the differentiated unity comprising the ‘integral
state’. Extensive use is made of quotations from the
interviews to explain how opposition to the Bingu wa
Mutharika regime was articulated at the College,
thereby illustrating how civil society served as one of
several terrains over which a passive revolution was
enacted. Research participants were approached on the
Chancellor College campus in Zomba using random
stratified sampling, a strategy approached with a degree
of caution given that dismissals and arrests had ensued
following recent protests. We were careful in explaining
what the interview process involved and, due to
practical constraints and the time-consuming process
of engaging participants in the research, the sample size
was constrained. Anonymised interviewees include
senior academics, lecturers and technicians, who make
up half the sample, as well as all levels of students,
some of whom had been involved in protests and others
who had not. We used a purposeful sample with equal
gender distribution and ensured representation of a
variety of academic disciplines. Staff voices were just as
important as students, some were active in articulating
discontent, whereas others were not. The core themes
explored in the interviews were: perceptions of
Mutharika’s presidency pre-2009; the crisis of 2009–
2011; the protests at Chancellor College; reactions to
Mutharika’s death and the ascendency of Banda to the
presidency; and the perceptions of Banda’s presidency
and policies, including the crucial currency devaluation.
Interviews were undertaken rather than focus groups or
questionnaires to help maintain anonymity for partic-
ipants as the research themes covered highly con-
tentious issues. To further ensure anonymity, we have
also chosen to minimise detail provided on individual
participants.
Malawi 2009–12: an emerging organic
crisis
Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika enjoyed a
successful first term (2004–9) in office. Economic
growth was around 8 per cent per annum and agricul-
ture performed impressively (Gabay 2014). Govern-
ment fertiliser subsidies helped boost farmers’ incomes
and addressed the issue of food security, a longstanding
development challenge for Malawi (Dionne and Dulani
2013). Tobacco, the major export cash crop, flourished
and surplus maize was exported to Zimbabwe. In 2009
Mutharika stood for re-election. Facing no credible
opposition, he won a landslide victory, gaining an
absolute majority in the presidential election as well as
for his DPP (Democratic People’s Party) in parliament.
Although given a powerful mandate, economic success
and Mutharika’s popularity did not last: the seeds for
an organic crisis appeared to be sown. Mutharika
therefore sought to enhance his authority by embed-
ding himself and his allies in power while pursuing a
new economic and political programme that sought to
establish some autonomy from the international
economy.
A new Minister of Finance, Ken Kandodo, was
appointed in 2009. As a more ‘compliant’ and less
independent Minister, it appeared that he would follow
Mutharika’s economic programme better than his
predecessor in the first term (2004–9), Goodall
Gondwe, who had served in the IMF for 22 years
(Cammack 2011). The government thus implemented
new fiscal policies, attempting to stabilise the Malawian
Kwacha against the US Dollar, and renewing price
controls and fertiliser subsidies, against IMF advice.
Minimum-price rules were enforced in the tobacco
sector and four leading expatriate buyers were expelled
from Malawi, being labelled ‘exploitative colonialists’
by Mutharika for not adhering to price controls (BBC
2009). As well as demonstrating some autonomy of
action, Mutharika’s was a populist move, aiming to
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appeal to farmers facing difficulties at a time when the
global tobacco sector had slumped after the global
financial crisis. Poor performance in the tobacco sector,
which accounts for over 75 per cent of Malawi’s export
earnings, then contributed to a national economic
crisis. By 2010 many considered the Kwacha to be
overvalued by 10–20 per cent, and a parallel market in
foreign exchange had emerged. A mini devaluation was
implemented in late 2011, but the disparity grew to 80
per cent by early 2012. At this point, the IMF turned off
credit and demanded that the Kwacha be devalued by
40 per cent; however, Mutharika’s government ignored
this advice and continued to borrow to pay bills.
Foreign investment fell and businesses contracted, as a
financial crisis deepened and a lack of foreign exchange
led to shortages of consumer goods, price increases and
inflation, which eventually reached 9.8 per cent
(Cammack 2012).
The donor community was supportive during
Mutharika’s first term, including, perhaps surprisingly,
backing his fertiliser subsidies programme (Sachs
2012). However, political elites within Malawi became
embroiled in a fierce battle with international financial
organisations as the former opposed further liberalisa-
tion and external interference. In response, donors cut
funding when Mutharika delayed decentralisation and
other liberal reforms (Cammack 2011). The exasper-
ated Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the
European Union, Alexander Baum set out in a public
statement that Malawi needed reform:
one does not have to be an economic genius to conclude that
what the country needs is a diversification of its export base
as well as liberalisation of its trade regime. (2011, 2)
Mutharika, however, appeared to disagree. Instead,
his neo-patrimonial ‘developmental’ vision for Malawi
stemmed from the 1970s, favouring mega-project-led
modernisation with some degree of autonomy of action
(Cammack 2011 2012). The ruling regime reflected this
vision and operated according to its own rationalities of
patronage, grandeur and reciprocity (Bayart 1993).
Ministers, including the President’s brother, Peter
Mutharika, benefited from this patronage (Cammack
et al. 2010). Malawi continued to interact with the
external environment, but did not reproduce the
governmental rationalities promoted by the liberal
‘good governance’ discourse of the IMF, World Bank
and aid donors. International donors therefore with-
drew essential large-scale budget support in response to
the economic policies. Imports declined, petrol stations
ran dry and the price of transport increased, while food
deliveries were held up, pushing the economy further
into decline. In the main cities of Blantyre and
Lilongwe, the population endured electricity blackouts
and drug shortages in the hospitals. All groups suffered,
but particularly the middle class.
In 2009, Mutharika did not fully withdraw Malawi
from the global economy, but attempted to forge a
slightly different path that involved putting forward a
new vision for the nation. In so doing, he attempted to
modify how Malawi interacted with international cap-
ital, through, for instance, tobacco price-setting. He
also took a role in negotiating contracts either person-
ally or through close contacts, enabling rent extraction
(Cammack et al. 2010) and a tighter grip on power built
on a close circle of allies who benefited from patron-
age, and through appealing to a broad constituency
through new social and cultural policies. Bayart (1993)
pays particular attention to the symbolic political value
of imported luxuries within extraversion. As Malawi’s
relationship with the international community soured,
the governing regime made lavish purchases of a
controversial presidential private jet, eight luxury
Hummer vehicles, and Mercedes cars and buses that
were used for political campaigns. These purchases
angered donors and civil society: the UK government,
notably, reduced aid by £3m after the jet purchase
(Cammack et al. 2010). And yet the vehicles became
symbolically important in extending patronage to close
allies and fostering broader notions of prestige. Patri-
monial relationships further included the politicisation
of key government appointments, manipulating chiefs,
favouring southern Malawians from the president’s
own Lomwe tribe, and positioning his brother Peter as
a potential successor (Cammack 2012). The peculiar
mixture of consent and coercion exercised by the
Mutharika regime involved fostering consensus
through such forms of extraversion, while also being
ruthless in the forms of domination visited on anyone
opposing the leading group. At the same time,
Mutharika sought to articulate a populist vision out
of the contradictory and fragmented forms of common
sense that existed within Malawi, exploiting, in partic-
ular, social anxieties over homosexual behaviour.
Thus, in May 2010, a Malawian gay couple were
sentenced to 14 years in prison after being convicted of
‘unnatural acts’. Mutharika said ‘In all aspects of
reasoning, in all aspects of human understanding, these
two gay boys were wrong, totally wrong’. Although he
pardoned the couple under pressure from the UN, a
culture of hate remained (BBC 2010). As Biruk argues
‘Mutharika sought to bolster his political legitimacy via
manipulation of a notion of “culture”’ (2014, 452), he
captured public attention and generated discussion by
providing
citizens and leading public figures [with] access to a set of
terms (homosexuality, gays, gay marriage, gay rights, condi-
tional aid) to be deployed in a novel idiom of social and
public commentary, ‘African homophobia’. (2014, 451)
Sadgrove et al. (2012) construct a situated under-
standing of the politics of homosexuality in Uganda
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that points to the ability to weave a narrative out of
popular fears. In a South African context, Hart,
drawing in large part on Hunter’s (2011) analysis of
the gendered politics of social reproduction in the
country, demonstrates how Jacob Zuma was able to
connect with and speak to the painful articulations of race,
class, gender and sexuality in the everyday lives of many
poor black South Africans [thereby] redefining the hege-
monic languages of contention. (2013, 205)
Mutharika sought to do the same, drawing on
popular fears while weaving a narrative and a language
that bolstered a sense of his own moral authority. Gay
rights were not the only arena in which Mutharika
sought to articulate this specific form of authoritarian
populism. In a move that sought to displace criticisms
of his own leadership, he went on to call for a return to
the ‘good old days’ of socially conservative attitudes
enforced by Hastings Kamuza Banda, the pre-1994
dictator, introducing new regulations on the media,
greater police powers, a new local courts act, as well re-
designing the national flag to closely match the imagery
of the DPP (Cammack 2012).
Mutharika simultaneously used prestige, coercion
and crude forms of populism to exercise power and
authority. As human rights violations increased, it was
unsurprising that many students and NGOs claimed the
country was descending once more into dictatorship
(Africa Confidential 2011). More broadly, disaffection
was growing towards the disastrous economic policies
that had generated declining living standards and were
threatening food security. What emerged was a tense
landscape, with sporadic disputes developing across
social, cultural and economic spheres. Depressing man-
ifestations of such a politics of fear and hatred began to
occur in places such as markets, where women were
attacked for wearing trousers and miniskirts, patterns of
dress illegal inMalawi until 1994 but now commonplace.
At the same time, violent clashes between informal
traders and police occurred over the right to sell in
different locations and fights occurred outside petrol
stations as motorists awaited fuel.
The deteriorating moral and political situation
raised the concerns of the donor community. A cable
criticising the government was sent by the British High
Commissioner, Fergus Cochrane-Dyet, who claimed
Mutharika was ‘becoming ever more autocratic and
intolerant of criticism’ (BBC 2011). When Wikileaks
released the cable, in April 2011, the High Commis-
sioner was expelled. His Malawian counterpart was
then asked to leave the UK, and the British govern-
ment withdrew donor funds equivalent to 13.4 per cent
of GDP. Following the leak, Mutharika, ‘became very
angry because he was being feted [framed] as this
socialist way with this intolerance of criticism and
dissenting voices’ (interview 21). Germany also halved
budget support in 2011 (Africa Confidential 2011). As
the economic situation worsened, the DPP responded
by increasing taxes, causing further price rises. On the
surface, these policies may appear to be self-defeating
for Mutharika; however, while harming the majority
and angering the donor community, they strengthened
neo-patrimonial and clientelist relationships among the
national elite, including the Mulli Brothers, some of
Malawi’s most prominent business people who gained
from government fertiliser contracts. Consensus
thereby remained tight among Mutharika’s closest
allies. At the same time, he was able to knit together
a coalition of disparate interests through a seemingly
populist stance on ‘moral’ issues and through offering
on-going support from small tobacco producers.
Mutharika’s ‘moral stance’ simultaneously enabled
suppression of any real sources of opposition and a
veneer of popular support, carefully fostered through
an attempt to maximise fear of specific social groups. In
the midst of economic crisis, cohesion was above all
maintained within the national elite as Mutharika had
grown the party base and political support through the
cabinet, while coercion could be exercised outside on
subaltern social groups (Abrahamsen 1997). Further-
more, while the socially regressive policies increasingly
soured the relationship with donors, they did not lead
to donor retreat. As Gabay argues, the ultimate cause
of donors leaving was ‘not human rights, but rather
politico-economic relationships’ (2014, 384). Indeed
international opposition to worsening civil rights within
the country enabled Mutharika to shift the blame for
donor retreat away from his economic policies.
Opposition to Mutharika: protest at Chancellor
College
Opposition to Mutharika grew in his second term and
the political settlement of 2009 was openly challenged
by strikes and protests in 2011 and 2012. An aspiring
middle class, frustrated intellectuals, student, and an
urban working class began to weave an oppositional
narrative. Dissent took ‘a triangular shape’, made up of
three forces: the donors, human rights-focused civil
society and opposition politicians (interview 19). As an
organic crisis began to develop, news from Egypt and
Tunisia simultaneously influenced the political elite’s
perception of the overall climate (Cammack 2012).
Street protests seemed to give weight to their concerns.
Thus, in February 2011, the police blocked peaceful
protesters over fuel shortages. Mutharika, expressing a
growing concern about the events further North in the
continent, claimed that protestors were copying those
in Tahrir Square (Biruk 2014). Later, protests in mid
July 2011 were met by violence orchestrated by the
Mutharika regime. Material force is only used by the
state to control society on a large scale ‘in periods of
exceptional crisis’ (Femia 1975, 31). Such a moment of
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exceptional crisis erupted in protests organised by
NGOs around civil rights, donor relations and eco-
nomic decline in three cities on 20 July 2011. Before
the protests, DPP youths drove around the main cities
in pick-up trucks carrying pangas (machetes) and
intimidating potential demonstrators. On the day of
the protests, demonstrators were blocked from protest-
ing by the authorities and 19 people were killed when
the police used live bullets (Africa Confidential 2011;
Gabay 2014). Revolt was supressed by the coercive
apparatus of the ruling party and state, while further
violence included what appear to be politically moti-
vated murders and the arrest of a former Attorney
General (Lee 2012). The 20 July protest reflected ‘a
general outcry, but it was mainly initiated by the civil
society . . . it was just a short period of time where
people protested’ (interview 14). Following the protest
the UN led negotiations with civil society in August and
further demonstrations were postponed until 2012.
In parallel to the urban protests, a series of events at
Chancellor College contributed to the emergence of a
fledgling opposition. These events began when Dr
Blessings Chinsinga, Associate Professor of Political
Science, compared the Malawian situation and the on-
going social revolution in Tunisia:
[Chinsinga] was giving an example in class, on the revolution
and those things like ‘the Arab’s did this and then that’s how
the government changes, so we can also do that. As that is
how things change most of the time’. So he gave that
example in class then after some days he was called by the
Inspector General [of Police], Peter Mukhito, who was
asking him. ‘Why did you give such an example in class? Are
you trying to tell the students to protest? Are you against the
government?’ (Interview 20)
Chinsinga responded to Mukhito by saying that he
could not continue teaching because his academic
freedom was threatened. The lecturers’ union went on
to boycott ‘unsafe’ classrooms in solidarity, while
Mutharika accused Chinsinga of ‘teaching revolution’
(Cammack 2012, 377). Chancellor College became
crisis ridden, with demonstrations by staff and students
being met by police using live bullets and tear gas. The
campus closed on 4 April 2011 and the protest gained
national attention, raising the profile of the emerging
organic crisis. Nevertheless, even if Malawians became
more aware of the government’s intolerance of dissent
(and interviewees certainly believed that news from
Chancellor College popularised dissent), only a small
fraction of the population, mainly urban and linked to
formal ‘civil society’ organisations, participated in
subsequent protests.
Civil society: what type of ‘opposition’?
Educated middle classes made up the majority of this
protest movement, both on the streets and inside the
university campus. In this way, the events of 2011
follow a pattern long observed in African civil unrest
(Bayart 1993). Particularly prominent were middle-
class leaders of formal civil society organisations such
as the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC)
(interview 5). Civil society organisations therefore
become a channel for a specific type of opposition,
often linked to international groups and expressed in
demands for ‘good governance’ and ‘democratisation’.
In Malawi, opposition parties remain fundamentally
weak and civil society groups become crucial vectors
for a limited opposition, usually lacking any economic
vision and remaining focused on questions of civil
rights (Cammack 2012). International donors have
long promoted civil society in Africa as a key to
facilitating a range of multilateral development agen-
das. ‘Civil society’ in this sense is co-imbricated with
neo-liberal models of governance (Gabay 2011). How
civil society organisations operate locally can be
unpredictable, but, as part of the apparatus of
international development, they tend to represent
extensions of historical and imperial forms of gover-
nance. Successful prominent civil society organisations
typically prioritise an agenda of anti-corruption
reform, human rights protection or gender main-
streaming. What angered the particular civil society
actors leading the opposition to Mutharika were
‘disrespect for human rights, governance problems’
(interview 5). Urban-based, elite organisations may
genuinely support these issues, but they also, to some
extent, perform to an international audience that
supplies finance, publicity and acclaim (Gaynor 2011).
However there is diversity within civil society organ-
isations, for example on 16 March 2011, 91 civil
society organisations hand-delivered a petition con-
demning threats to human rights activists and
Malawi’s shift ‘into a dictatorship once again’ to the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights in Geneva, but some of the civil society
organisations did not oppose the criminalisation of
homosexuals, and a few revised their sponsorship of
the petition (Africa Confidential 2011). If Malawian
civil society is diverse, ranging from those who provide
resistance to the state and/or donors to those respon-
sible for a consolidation of neoliberal reform, it is
predominantly led by elites and often lacks the broad
appeal needed through a failure to address material
concerns such as access to food and housing.
The supposedly democratising tendency of NGOs
cannot, therefore, be taken for granted, and the type of
representation they offer in contemporary ‘democratic’
African societies remains fundamentally limited.
Indeed, rather than challenging international develop-
ment models, Malawian civil society generally provides
greater legitimacy to neoliberal forms of governance,
thereby reinforcing existing inequalities (Gaynor 2010)
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while hindering the potential for more radical or
transformative perspectives to gain a voice within an
increasingly monopolised ‘oppositional politics’.
Through detailed exploration of civil society organisa-
tions linked to global networks operating in Malawi,
Gabay (2011) and Gaynor (2011) have demonstrated
how organisations are disciplined by the discursive
framings of the MDGs (Millennium Development
Goals) and Poverty Strategy Reduction Papers. The
attention of these groups comes to be focused on
governance, formal government engagement and hold-
ing policy makers accountable. Civil society leaders
thereby become increasingly dependent on external
donors for resources and inspiration, leading to rela-
tionships of discipline, restraint and also consent with
international neoliberal agendas. Formal civil society
organisations have become crucial to the specific form
of passive revolution unfolding in Malawi. Bayart
(2000, 226) therefore describes the emphasis on ‘the
fairy story called Democracy’ as a contemporary
example of Gramsci’s reading of ‘transformism’, some-
thing he suggests furthers a kind of ‘anti-politics
machine’. He continues:
By head-hunting many of the brightest African intellectuals
with the high salaries awarded to international civil servants,
by celebrating the virtues of ‘civil society’ and ‘good
governance’ and distributing largesse in the service of this
cause, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund have in effect co-opted and confined those potential
counter-elites within a ‘legitimate’ problematique of devel-
opment, i.e. the so-called consensus of Washington. In doing
so they have done their part to promote a multilateralization
of the passive revolution whose principal and political vector
is the state. (2000, 226)
The figure who would become so crucial to rede-
ploying the vector of the state in enacting a second
moment in Malawi’s passive revolution was Muthar-
ika’s own vice president, Joyce Banda; however, in
2011, Banda’s moment was yet to come. Indeed, as a
vocal critic of Mutharika’s second term, she appeared
sidelined within the state apparatus. Banda had been a
successful businesswoman and leader of the National
Business Women Association, rising to prominence as a
women’s rights and education activist. She entered
parliament in 1999 and became foreign minister in
2006, later receiving wide international praise through
maintaining close relationships with the donor com-
munity and becoming a key supporter of the Millen-
nium Development Goals (Harland Scott 2013). It was
somewhat surprising that Banda was selected as
Mutharika’s vice president in 2009; however, the
appointment enabled the latter to appease donors in
the run-up to the election. When Mutharika’s policies
shifted in his second term, Banda nevertheless became
politically isolated. By 2011, she had little political
influence, later going on to form her own People’s Party
(PP) (Dionne and Dulani 2013). With Banda sidelined
and the constitution only allowing for a president to
serve two terms, it was Mutharika’s brother, Peter, who
was now positioned as the most likely successor. As the
economic crisis rumbled on in 2011, frustrations grew:
Mutharika’s response was a cabinet reshuffle, but no
significant change in policy. Instead, attempts were
made to weaken and divide the dissenting voices within
formal civil society groups through offers of jobs and
scholarships, backed up by intimidation and police
harassment. At Chancellor College the dispute with the
lectures lasted until an uneasy settlement in November
2011.
Mutharika’s heart attack
In the midst of the crisis an unexpected event occurred:
Bingu wa Mutharika suddenly died of a heart attack on
5 April 2012. When news reached Chancellor College,
‘most of the students celebrated’ (interview 5). As one
interviewee commented, ‘I thought it right to say “he’s
gone please somebody come in so we can see a
change”’ (interview 12). Celebrations were tempered by
confusion with ‘no actual report from the hospital that
Bingu had died’ (interview 17). Peter Mutharika then
tried to illegally seize power, but the constitution was
upheld and Joyce Banda became southern Africa’s first
female president. The adherence to legal process was
widely praised and Banda soon began to win interna-
tional accolades while restoring Malawi’s reputation on
the world stage. In this second moment of Malawi’s
passive revolution, Banda steered the country from
authoritarian nationalism to a collaborative relation-
ship with the external environment. Her first steps in
office involved improving the context for international
capital by inviting tobacco managers back and opening
negotiations with the IMF. Banda then began address-
ing human rights concerns by appointing a new
Inspector General of Police and a new head of the
state media, as well as restoring the design of the
national flag. In moves calculated to appease the
international community, she subsequently called for
the arrest of Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir if he
attended the African Union Summit in Malawi. Later,
in a further act of appeasement, Banda reportedly sold
the fleet of 60 Mercedes and the private presidential
jet, although the ownership of the jet remained unclear.
International acclaim followed: Banda was recognised
as Forbes magazine’s most powerful woman in Africa,
one of Time magazine’s 100 most influential people in
the world, and she received an honorary doctorate in
economics from the University of Jeonju, South Korea,
as well as gaining praise from David Cameron, Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama. Ultimately, however, as
with Mutharika’s previous isolation, it was economic
policy rather than personal leadership that was most
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important in determining Malawi’s relationship with
the West. As Gabay records
it is notable that donors, under the auspices of IMF
negotiation, only reinstated funds to Malawi once Joyce
Banda agreed to devalue the Kwacha upon ascending to the
presidency. (2014, 376)
At Chancellor College some were highly critical and
believed Banda was a handmaiden to foreign influence.
She appeared ‘to be a puppet of the west, or to be a
puppet of the IMF’ and interviewee 22 continued
At the time she was talking about the gay rights, many
people in Malawi are saying ‘no we don’t want it’, but she
said ‘no’ and because she wanted to get the donor money,
she said ‘we are going to implement this’.
Importantly, Banda broke from some of the
languages of hegemony fostered by Mutharika who
claimed shared cultural and moral values within the
criminalising of homosexuality. At the same time, in
enacting this break – passive revolution through the
form of the state – Banda appeared to lack the
‘vision’ and popular legitimacy of her predecessor
(interview 22). Mutharika’s dubious moral claims had
served to neutralise popular antagonisms. Banda did
not make the same efforts, instead seeking to lead
through the legitimacy offered by formal civil society
organisations and the international community. At the
same time, and somewhat paradoxically, Banda drew
upon support from the same dominant group as
Mutharika. In the words of one, she had ‘taken [the]
same old politicians and put them into key positions.
You see the same people but changing their colours,
being a jackal to a wolf and so forth’ (interview 22),
leading to a restoration of the neo-patrimonial
relationships between the dominant class and the
external environment, more characteristic of Muthar-
ika’s first term in office (Cammack et al. 2010).
Extraversion as a form of passive revolution for the
post-colonial state was thereby renewed. This meant
that ‘in terms of following what the West wants she
has done very well’ (interviewee 25). Indeed the
Banda government restored the nation to a position
where it was more favourably aligned with interna-
tional capital. Banda’s interventions and leadership of
the dominant group can be viewed as a counter
revolutionary move, steering the nation away from
crisis and embracing the political rule of capital. As
has been demonstrated in research into civil society
organisations in Malawi (Gabay 2011; Gaynor 2011),
Banda was part of the apparatus of a liberal model
for international development. A disparity emerged
between her positive international image and local
frustration:
to the whites, that’s to say people from UK, she’s popular
there . . . On the other hand for us, being Malawian, it is not
good and she is not popular at the moment because of the
devaluation she did. (Interview 18)
The impact of devaluation
Soon after gaining power, Banda devalued the Kwacha
by 50 per cent and floated the currency, a move praised
by the international community. Christine Lagarde,
Managing Director of the IMF, visited Malawi in early
2013 and congratulated the President for her bold
economic policies and the liberalisation of the foreign
exchange market. The returned British High Commis-
sioner Michael Nevin confidently stated: ‘There are
sound macroeconomic policies that the country is using
which will result in economic recovery’ (Kachali 2013).
The devaluation improved the business environment
for firms operating transnationally, assisting the export
of tobacco in particular (Malawi Today 2012). However,
as one interviewee noted, the devaluation was ‘devas-
tating’ for the poor (interview 3). Steep increases in the
price of basic goods pushed many Malawians deeper
into poverty (CfSC 2012). Indeed the intervention in
many ways mirrored the shock treatments imposed in
the 1970s and 80s as part of Structural Adjustment
Programmes across the developing world, a process
that had horrific social impacts while benefitting
international capital in the form of transnational
corporations (Abrahamsen 1997; Morton 2003).
Rather than a managed transition, ‘everything has
hiked up, things which were costing 200 kwacha are
now costing 500 kwacha’ (interview 3) and there were
‘no government policies as to how they would protect
the poor’ (interview 1). The devaluation especially hit
the urban poor, who faced a 38.5 per cent increase in
food prices, according to the National Statistical Office
(Malawi Voice 2013).
While the impacts on livelihoods were devastating in
the short term, research participants noted that the
policies would bring improvements for some interest
groups, including the Consumer Association of Malawi,
who welcomed the devaluation. The Governor of the
Reserve Bank of Malawi, Charles Chuka, argued it
would bring inward investment and enable the IMF to
signal an ‘all clear to all Malawi’s cooperating partners
that it was safe to do business with Malawi’ (New People
2012, 35). Joyce Banda also actively sought new
investment, inviting the British private sector to come
and invest in the country when visiting business leaders
in London. Specific new government measures
included deregulating the private sector, creating new
investment opportunities in areas such as electricity
generation and mining, eliminating price controls, and
terminating import restrictions and import licences.
Liberal economic policies ensured support from groups
aligned with international capital, but also fostered
some broader support among university staff and
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students at Chancellor College who favoured the
dominant development model. Although they all
observed that high inflation hit the poor and salaried
workers, the availability of foreign exchange and fuel
curtailed the burgeoning black market and facilitated
transport. For some the reforms were welcome: ‘from
an economics point of view I think it was a good thing’
(interview 8). Another interviewee noted ‘we now have
those non-governmental organisations like UNICEF
back’ (interview 9). If some within the country there-
fore joined the international community in welcoming
Banda’s revolution/restoration, the restored engage-
ment with the external environment also led some to be
deeply critical of the new relationships:
The donor community requires free trade . . . . [and] requires
the removal of subsidies, you know as a developing country
there must be a [fertiliser] subsidy programme in order to help
those that cannot afford . . . It [the donor community] encour-
ages privatization so many people are leaving from their jobs
and are just roaming around . . .Weare not competitive enough
to compete on the open market. (Interview 22)
The restoration of close relationships between the
international community and the government was
stabilising ‘aspects which the World Bank and IMF
like to see stabilised and destabilised the aspects that
Malawians like to see stabilised’ (interview 26). There-
fore there was a mixed perception of Joyce Banda’s
presidency, but what was clear was that Malawi was not
in the same state of organic crisis and the conditions
that had led to violent discontent and protest in 2011
were not present in 2012.
Passive revolution in Malawi
It is important to consider the continuities and changes
between the leadership of the two presidents. The
tenuous legitimacy of Mutharika’s Presidency drew
from a disparate group of supporters. As well as
support from a domestic political elite that benefited
from the extraversion of Mutharika’s first term, the
latter bolstered his unravelling hegemony in the second
term through an attempt to neuter developing antag-
onisms by displacing them onto popular moral con-
cerns. Although clearly contradicted by his first term in
office, Mutharika developed a language of nationalism
and autonomy that appeared to be opposed to the
policy prescriptions of the international financial insti-
tutions. In contrast, Banda quickly surrendered the
initiative to transform Malawi, which could have built
on and given voice to the fledgling opposition that
emerged in 2011, and, instead, reverted back to a form
of extraversion, working to gain support primarily from
international donors, but also the army, neighbouring
states and key parts of civil society (Gabay 2014). As we
argued at the outset, the revolution/restoration that
marks the transition from Mutharika to Banda can be
understood as a moment within the passive revolution
that has been enacted over the postcolonial period
within Malawi. Rather than revolution, the new, or
reformed, dominant group within the state moved from
an autocratic, national and inward-looking approach to
capitalism, to a benign pro-market version championed
by the international community. The transition from
Mutharika to Banda represents a reorganisation of
capitalism during a period of state crisis, bolstered by
the continuing rise of neoliberalism through structural
change. In this sense it charts a similar path to forms of
passive revolution in the global South mapped by
Morton (2003). Transformation came from ‘on-high’
and occurred without mass participation. Simultane-
ously, the support Banda received from formal civil
society and the donor community represents the
‘multilateralization of passive revolution’ indicated by
Bayart (2000, 226).
During periods of passive revolution change occurs as
the dominant class reacts to the ‘sporadic and incoherent
rebelliousness of the popular masses’ by agreeing to
some of these demands, or at least appearing to do so
(Morton 2010, 318), while simultaneously neutralising
its power base through forms of transformism. Thus,
Banda’s presidency represented a popular return to the
rule of law and she initially received a warm welcome for
her implementation of reforms that appeased civil
society organisations. Prominent leaders of civil society
organisations praised the ways in which her policies met
their demands, including the restored diplomatic and
international relations and the resumption of aid;
enhanced human rights; an improved separation of
power between the executive, parliament and judiciary; a
more inclusive and less nepotistic approach to appoint-
ing key government and parastatal officials; and an
opening up of political space for community service
organisations (Trapence et al. 2012). Although these
leaders were not without their concerns around media
freedom, security and corruption.1 Banda also made
important symbolic gestures, using the language and
rhetoric of poverty reduction while reforming the
political settlement. Overall, the state selectively met
demands from civil society, reproducing new forms of
social relations through two processes: state-led initia-
tives in the form of devaluation that restored a liberal
capitalist system of accumulation and an assimilation of
demands from civil society organisations without any
real shift in power relations. For Gabay the period
demonstrates ‘a largely continuous political economy
which problematizes the notion that what has occurred
in Malawi can be called a “transition”’ (2014, 375).
Interviewees at Chancellor College confirm this sense
that the country is ‘slipping back to how things are
routinely done’ (interview 25). Nevertheless, if continu-
ity represents one aspect to Malawi’s passive revolution,
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it can also be read as a move to a new ‘capitalist
trajectory’. It is impossible to separate the revolution/
restoration of domestic political relations within Malawi
from the global political economy within which this
change-without-change has occurred. Banda’s compro-
mise with international capital echoes earlier instances
of an unfolding passive revolution across the continent.
Fatton’s analysis of the Senegalese passive revolution
therefore describes a situation similar toMalawi in which
the IMF-inspired plan of austerity has reinforced social
inequalities and failed to confront those dominant political
forces which have a vested interest in the preservation of the
status quo. (1986, 748)
Joyce Banda’s passive revolution went further and
did not just lead to the stabilisation of class interests,
but opened the economy to international investment,
not just from the West, but also from China and other
emerging economies. Through the combination of
organic crisis and the chance circumstance of Muthar-
ika’s heart attack, change became possible. Neverthe-
less, wrought through the dominant class, the changes
ushered in were consonant with global neoliberalism
(Morton 2003). It was a consistent observation that the
reforms introduced by Banda had improved the
economic situation for the affluent and would lead to
a widening gap between rich and poor.
Those that are poor become poorer, those that are rich
become richer. Those that are top officials in Malawi . . .
they are really enjoying [themselves]. (Interview 12)
Political capital and membership of the dominant
group was seen as being key to prosperity: ‘For those in
politics, not just in the government, but politics, I think
they are making it [money] and it’s sad’ (interview 13).
Conclusion
In Bayart’s (1993 2000) terms, a process of extraversion
first enabled Mutharika to actively foster a series of
unequal relationships with the international community
to the benefit of himself and his closest allies within the
country. Subsequently, the changes wrought through the
Malawian state by Banda’s regime are an example of
change without mass participation and thus a ‘revolution
from above’. The absence of a popular voice is analo-
gous to the lack of mass popular engagement in the
development of modern Italy. Such a moment could
have provided a window of opportunity for a radical
renegotiation of the political settlement but instead what
occurred was the restoration of the political rule of
capital ‘lacking a radical national-popular “Jacobin”
moment’ (Morton 2010, 317). Confined within what
Bayart (2000, 226) refers to as a ‘“legitimate” prob-
lematique of development’ articulated by her allies
within the international financial institutions, Banda
enabled a deepening of neo-patrimonial relations at the
same time as breaking with them. Fledgling opposition
to such a strategy of extraversion from local civil servants
and the domestically educated, like those at Chancellor
College, are subsequently marginalised. Aiming to
create a modern, outward-looking liberal state, Banda
and her international allies, to quote Gramsci on the
failures to produce a modern Italian state, ‘produced a
bastard’ (Q19, §28; 1971, 90).
In situations such as Mutharika’s second term, when
protest movements develop without the Jacobin ele-
ment necessary for revolutionary transformation, they
fail to effect progressive transformation. Change occurs
instead through a strengthening of the state and a
neutralising of dissent through processes of trans-
formism. Passive revolution is here conceived as an
active political strategy, similar to that Gramsci saw
having unfolded after the 1848 revolutions and after
the Paris Commune in 1871. However, in its contem-
porary manifestation it involves a re-actualisation of
dominant relations of force through neoliberalism and
‘good governance’. Joyce Banda was largely responsible
for effecting this second moment in Malawi’s passive
revolution. In contrast, enabling progressive change in
Malawi would mean producing a fundamentally differ-
ently ‘political’ (Thomas 2009b), through building on
the rational kernel of good sense within the fragmented
and contradictory understandings of common sense
among Malawi’s subaltern groups. Articulating this
good sense requires a coherence that challenges the
passivity often generated by common sense, and a
‘cathartic moment’ through which subaltern groups
might move from disparate sets of interests into a
world-changing movement. No such coalition of inter-
ests is currently emerging in Malawi; this was readily
apparent from the interviews. However, the interviews
also suggest the possibility for articulating a somewhat
different vision of Malawi’s future that might break
from the ongoing nightmare of passive revolution.
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Note
1 Joyce Banda was later embroiled in the ‘cashgate’ corrup-
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